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Abstract: 
The Big Data phenomenon, and its uptake in qualitative research, raises 
ethical issues around data aggregation, data linkages, and data 
anonymization as well as concerns around changing meanings and 
possibilities of informed consent and privacy protection. In this article I 
address the ethical issues that arise from Big Data through a posthumanist 
philosophical framework. The humanist ethics that underpins normative 
ethical concerns—as outlined above—focuses on the unequal power 
relationship between researchers and research subjects and the potential 
harm that research can cause to research participants. Ethical practice 
consists in following guidelines and codes of ethical conduct designed, not 
so much to avoid these power differentials, but to protect research 
participants from potential exploitation and infringements of their human 
rights. Unethical research is understood as research that breaches these 
principles and/or harms its research subjects. A posthumanist ethics treats 
knowledge-making itself as a matter of ethical concern. It shifts the focus 
away from the power of researchers over research participants towards the 
‘world-making’ powers of practices of inquiry: their ability to constitute 
(and not simply discover) the very nature of their objects/subjects of 
study. Its focus of ethical concern—what it regards as unethical—is 
research that claims to represent the world ‘as it really is’. On this 
appraoch, ethical practice consists in accounting for the ways in which 
research ontologically constitutes its objects and subjects of study. The 
critical intervention made possible by bringing a posthumanist perspective 
to bear on the ethics of qualitative research in a Big Data is to foreground 
Big Data’s treatment of data as self-evident, and its positivist claim to 
represent the world innocently, accurately and objectively, as matters of 
ethical concern. 
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Towards a posthumanist ethics of qualitative research in a Big Data era 
Natasha S. Mauthner 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This article explores the ethical issues raised by qualitative research in a Big Data era 
through a specifically posthumanist approach. It is important to highlight, at the 
outset, that a posthumanist understanding of research ethics marks a radical departure 
from how we are accustomed to thinking about ethics. Conventional approaches to 
ethics focus on the unequal power relationship between researchers and research 
subjects and the potential harm that research can cause to research participants. 
Ethical practice consists in following guidelines and codes of ethical conduct (such as 
informed consent, and ensuring privacy, anonymity and confidentiality) designed, not 
so much to avoid these power differentials, but as far as possible to protect research 
participants from potential exploitation and infringements of their human rights. 
Unethical research is understood as research that breaches these principles and/or 
harms its research subjects. In this context, the ethical challenges posed by Big Data 
stem, for example, from the ambiguous public/private nature of social media data, and 
the fact that these data are not generated for research purposes and therefore tend to 
be used without the explicit consent of those who have provided them. Similarly, Big 
Data research involving the aggr gation of datasets or reuse of archived data may also 
proceed without informed consent from the data originators, and the data linkages 
made possible by such practices can pose risks to people by exposing their identities, 
and compromising their privacy and anonymity. For these reasons, new Big Data 
practices are causing researchers to rethink many of the cornerstones of research 
ethics. 
 
My purpose in this article is to rethink the ethics of Big Data in light of a recent turn 
to posthumanism and a posthumanist ethics. Notions of both posthumanism and a 
posthumanist ethics have been variously defined and understood (Alaimo & Hekman, 
2008; Åsberg, 2013; Barad, 2007; Bennett, 2001, 2010; Braidotti, 2002, 2006, 2013; 
de Freitas, 2017; Dolphijn & van der Tuin, 2012; Hinton, 2013; Hollin et al., 2017; 
Mauthner, 2018; Puig de la Bellacasa, 2017; Rekret, 2016; Thiele, 2014). The term 
‘posthumanism’ encompasses distinctive theoretical approaches that engage with the 
concept of ‘humanism’ in different ways and to varying degrees. These include 
‘transhumanism’, and its focus on human enhancement through biological and 
technological means (Fukuyama, 2002; Stock, 2002); ‘non-humanism’ and its 
concern with the role and agency of non-human entities such as animals, matter, 
technologies and bodies (Grusin, 2015); and ‘antihumanism’, which rejects and 
assumes the symbolic death of the humanist subject defined as the locus of will, 
reason, intentionality and consciousness (see Ferrando, 2013). Each of these positions 
entails a different approach to the question of ethics. For example, transhumanism 
raises ethical questions about the limits that should be placed on the freedom of 
people to control their own bodies; the ownership of genes and other living things; 
and which technologies should be mandatory, which voluntary, and which forbidden 
(Hughes, 2004). By contrast, a non-humanist ethics emphasizes ethical attunement 
and accountability to a material world of non-human beings beyond the finite human 
subject (Rekret, 2016), and seeks ways of sharing ethical responsibility with these 
non-humans entities (Verbeek, 2009). Attempts to conceptualize the ethics of 
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algorithms involved in Big Data (e.g. Mittelstadt et al., 2016) could be seen as an 
example of the latter approach. 
 
In this article I take up Karen Barad’s (2007) distinctive notion of posthumanism. On 
my reading, her posthumanist philosophy entails decentering the human subject—
including the assumption that this subject is the locus of ethical agency and 
responsibility—as well as a more general questioning of the presumed existence and 
given-ness of all beings, including the human. Following Barad, the world is not 
composed of pre-existing and already-formed entities awaiting discovery by human 
knowers, whose ethical responsibility is to ensure that these entities are accurately 
represented and in a way that avoids harm. Rather, knowledge practices are 
understood to play a constitutive part in bringing their objects of study into existence, 
and are theorized as inseparably “onto-epistemological” (Barad, 2007, p. 185) or 
‘world-making’ (Haraway, 1997). Their powers to bring their specific objects of study 
into being—to give and deny life—confer an inescapable ethical dimension to 
practices of inquiry. They are seen as inherently morally consequential (Barad, 2007; 
Haraway, 1988, p. 593; Haraway, 2011) and as inseparably “ethico-onto-
epistemological” (Barad, 2007, p. 185). As Barad (2007, p. 37) suggests, “ethical 
concerns are not simply supplemental to the practice of science but an integral part of 
it”.  
 
A posthumanist ethics therefore shifts the focus away from the power of researchers 
over research participants towards the ‘world-making’ powers of practices of inquiry: 
their ability to constitute the very nature of their objects/subjects of study. The object 
of ethical concern from a posthumanist perspective—what it regards as unethical—is 
research that claims to innocently represent the world ‘as it really is’. It takes issue 
with claims to disembodied objective knowledge, and insists that practices of inquiry 
justify and account for themselves and their effects on the world. Bringing these 
insights to bear on qualitative research in a Big Data era displaces conventional 
ethical concerns with risks posed by research/ers to human subjects, and foregrounds 
instead Big Data’s treatment of data as self-evident and its practice of letting the data 
‘speak for themselves’ as moral issues.  
 
I further develop this argument by organising my article in two halves with three 
sections in each. The first half opens with a discussion of Big Data, its uptake in 
qualitative research, and the ethical challenges raised by these emerging practices. 
The next two sections—on humanism and its legacies in terms of moral philosophy 
and research ethics—bring into view the largely forgotten and naturalized humanist 
underpinnings of normative approaches to research ethics, including the ethics of Big 
Data. They show how a historically- and culturally-specific set of humanist 
philosophical assumptions and commitments have, over the centuries, given rise to 
the particular understandings and practices of research ethics that we now largely take 
as given. Materializing this humanist legacy is a necessary preliminary step to the 
development of a posthumanist ethics which is the focus of the second half of the 
paper. In this part I elaborate further on my understanding of posthumanism and a 
posthumanist ethics, by drawing on the works of feminist science studies scholars, 
Karen Barad and Donna Haraway. In the final part I return to the question of Big Data 
and argue that bringing a posthumanist perspective to bear on the ethics of Big Data 
opens up new and distinctive issues for ethical scrutiny, by positioning the implicit 
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positivist philosophy of science that underpins normative understandings and 
practices of Big Data as a matter of ethical concern. 
 
Qualitative research in a Big Data era and its ethical challenges 
 
The concept of ‘Big Data’ emerged in the early 2000s and was initially associated 
with sciences like astronomy and genomics before migrating to other areas of human 
enterprise (e.g. healthcare, government, business, finance, education).1 In its early 
use, the term referred to volumes of data—the so-called ‘data deluge’—that exceeded 
available computational storage and analysis capacities and capabilities, and that 
required the development of new processing technologies (Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, 2013). However, Big Data is understood to denote not only volumes of data 
but the speed and dynamic nature of their production—rapidly and continuously 
created in or near real-time—as well as their ontological features: diverse, exhaustive, 
fine-grained, indexical, relational, flexible, messy and unruly (Kitchin, 2014b; Mayer-
Schönberger & Cukier, 2013; Zwitter, 2014). boyd and Crawford (2012, p. 663) 
define Big Data as a sociotechnical phenomenon that maximizes “computation power 
and algorithmic accuracy,” and that involves searching, gathering, analyzing, 
aggregating, linking, and comparing large data sets “to identify patterns in order to 
make economic, social, technical, and legal claims”. Another aspect of Big Data is its 
production through the so-called ‘internet of things’ (Zwitter, 2014). Generation of 
data in this way involves both ‘digitization’—converting information into computer-
readable format—and what Mayer-Schönberger and Cukier (2013, p. 15) call 
“datafication”: turning aspects of our everyday lives and practices into quantified data 
which can be transformed into new forms of value. This, they suggest, is what makes 
data “the oil of the information economy” (Mayer-Schönberger & Cukier, 2013, p. 
16). The concept of Big Data, then, is invoked to signal large volumes of data as well 
as different types of data produced and handled in new ways. As Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier (2013, p. 6) explain: “big data refers to things one can do at a large scale 
that cannot be done at a smaller one, to extract new insights or create new forms of 
value.” 
 
The use of terms such as Big QualiData and Big QLR (Qualitative Longitudinal 
Research1) point to some of the ways Big Data discourses, practices and imaginaries 
are being taken up within qualitative research (see also Hossain and Scott-Villers, this 
volume).2 One example is the practice of ‘scaling up’ (Neale & Bishop, 2012) 
qualitative research achieved by augmenting the quantity of qualitative data being 
analysed. Scaling up qualitative research has been made possible in part by the 
growth of qualitative data archives over the past two decades following the 
introduction of data archiving, sharing and reuse policies and infrastructures.3 Scaling 
up qualitative datasets has also resulted from a growth in multi-site qualitative 
research studies, often large-scale international development projects (see Camfield, 
this volume). The growth in qualitative datasets is generating increasing numbers of 
qualitative data re-use studies (see Bishop & Kuula-Luumi, 2017) as well as renewed 
interest in qualitative longitudinal research (McLeod & Thomson, 2009; Thomson & 
McLeod, 2015). Rather than being entirely ‘new’, these practices build on, and 
reconfigure, already established research approaches and infrastructures. The recent 
expansion of qualitative archives, for example, builds on longer-running qualitative 
                                                
1 http://bigqlr.ncrm.ac.uk 
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data archives such as the UK’s Mass Observation Archive at the University of Sussex 
and the US Human Relations Area Files at Yale University, both initiated in the 
1930s. Similarly, the growing emphasis on, and importance of, secondary analysis can 
be seen as an extension (but also reconfiguration) of existing traditions and practices 
including secondary analyses of quantitative data by economists, revisits of classic 
studies by sociologists, returns to ethnographic fieldsites and fieldnotes by 
anthropologists, the creation and use of archival narratives by oral historians, and the 
use archives as source materials by historians (Holland, Thomson, & Henderson, 
2006; Thomson et al., 2014).  
 
The Big Data phenomenon is also generating new sources of textual data, particularly 
social media data produced through networking sites such as Facebook and Twitter 
(e.g. Robards & Lincoln, 2017). The volume, form and origin of these data is leading 
to what some have called a “computational turn” (boyd & Crawford, 2012, p. 665) in 
the social sciences. This is manifested in increasing collaboration between social and 
computer scientists, and in the emergence of new computer-based techniques for 
analysing, visualizing and representing these data, including the elaboration of 
automated methods for coding large volumes of textual data (e.g. Benoit et al., 2016; 
Karamshuk et al., 2017; Nulty et al., 2016; Tinati et al., 2014). Again, these Big Data 
computational techniques need to be placed within the broader technological history 
of the social sciences. This includes, for example, the development of computational 
technologies for managing machine-readable quantitative data in the 1960s which 
gave researchers the capacity to manipulate large datasets and to use complex 
methods of analysis in ways that had not been previously possible (Fienberg et al., 
1985). Similarly, the 1980s saw the introduction of Computer-Assisted Qualitative 
Data Analysis Software, which facilitated direct coding of the data and subsequent 
searches in the coded material (Brinkmann et al., 2014).  
 
Emerging qualitative research practices and methodologies associated with the Big 
Data phenomenon are generating a number of ethical challenges. For example, the use 
of social media data raises concerns about the use of these data without people’s 
awareness or consent, questions about the public/private status of these data, and risks 
of identification when multiple datasets are combined (e.g. Zimmer, 2010). A key 
ethical issue is that while different datasets may be innocuous on their own, when 
aggregated, they can compromise people’s identities and invade their privacy (see 
also Hauge et al., 2016; Metcalf & Crawford, 2016). This in turn is changing the 
nature, meaning and relevance of existing ethical practices. The notion of informed 
consent, for instance, can seem redundant in research using social media data, 
particularly when these data are considered to be already in the public domain and 
“consent often amounts to an unread terms of service or a vague privacy policy” 
(Metcalf & Crawford, 2016, p. 2). Similarly, the move towards routine archiving and 
secondary use of research data is prompting proposals for the adoption of broad or 
open consent as a replacement for traditional approaches to informed consent, which 
restrict how data can be used as they require researchers to contact participants and 
seek their consent for every new research project. While broad or open consent is 
presented as ‘best practice’ for social science data archives (e.g. Corti et al., 2014), it 
is not neutral in its effects. For example, broad or open consent, coupled with the idea 
that data are a naturally occurring resource (Mauthner, 2012), confer a deceptive self-
evidence onto the appropriation, commodification and commercialization of data. 
Thus, a significant concern raised by new forms of (qualitative and quantitative) data 
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and emerging data science methods—and echoing earlier debates about online 
research methods (e.g. Hine, 2000)—is the way in which they are reconfiguring what 
are regarded as the key principles of ethical research, including informed consent; 
minimal harm; protection of anonymity and confidentiality; respect for the rights, 
dignity and privacy of research subjects; avoidance of deception; and the right to 
withdraw from a research study (see Metcalf & Crawford, 2016; Zwitter, 2014).  
 
These ethical challenges and debates surrounding Big Data exemplify a normative 
approach to social science research ethics. While this understanding of research ethics 
is largely taken as given, it is a legacy of a humanist worldview and its philosophical 
commitment to human autonomy. Ethical principles and practices embody this 
commitment in their over-riding concern with protecting human rights, including the 
right to self-determination, privacy and autonomy; and in the development of codes of 
ethical conduct designed to honour, respect and safeguard these rights. The 
conceptualization of research ethics that we have inherited, that we pass on from one 
generation of researchers to the next, and that shapes how we think about the ethics of 
Big Data is therefore a throwback to humanist philosophies and their enshrinement of 
human rights and autonomy. In the next two sections of the paper I flesh out this 
argument in more detail. I begin with a discussion of humanism and its commitment 
to an ontology that is both anthropocentric and essentialist, before moving on to 
consider how this has shaped notions of morality and ethical practice, including 
within the social sciences. I argu  that humanist philosophies have given rise to what I 
call a ‘humanist ethics’: an ethics that (1) takes the rational human subject as both 
locus of moral agency and object of ethical concern; and (2) considers the domain of 
morality and ethics to be separate from that of science and knowledge-making. The 
purpose of this discussion is to de-naturalize the apparent self-evidence of 
contemporary ethics—including the ethics of qualitative research in a Big Data era—
by pointing to its specifically humanist philosophical underpinnings, and thereby open 
up the possibility of an alternative ethics situated in a posthumanist philosophical 
worldview, which I discuss in the second half of the paper. 
 
Humanist philosophies 
 
The term ‘humanism’ is associated with a cluster of ideas rather than denoting a 
unified worldview (Norman, 2012). While there are differences and similarities 
between Roman, Renaissance, Enlightenment, and 20th Century humanisms, for 
many, humanism’s defining feature is as a philosophy that places humans (rather than 
God) at the heart of its literary, philosophical and scientific projects. Humanism, as it 
emerged during the Renaissance and came into its own during the Enlightenment, 
released humans from the constraints of religious and other institutional belief 
systems and authorities, liberating them to govern themselves. As Christians (2005, p. 
139) suggests “The cult of human personality prevailed in all its freedom. Human 
beings were declared a law onto themselves, set loose from any faith that claimed 
their allegiance”. This emerging anthropocentrism was fuelled by the diminishing 
influence of the Church and the growth of individualism, and the increasing role of 
science and reason (versus the Church and religious faith) as primary sources of 
authority and legitimacy (Russell, 1946).  
 
Modern science, which began to emerge in the Renaissance period, sought to use 
human beings’ supposedly unique capacity for reason and observation to uncover the 
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universal laws of nature: “As a Cartesian thinking subject, man could examine the 
world and explain its workings with scientific detachment… This view of man as an 
autonomous agent, separate from though still engaged with nature, flourished in the 
Enlightenment” (Bolter, 2016, p. 1). Indeed, science played a critical role in setting 
human beings free both from nature—allowing “humans to dominate nature, which 
formerly had dominated them” (Christians, 2005, p. 139)—and from the moral order. 
In particular, the notion of a value free science was seen as necessary to the 
promotion of human autonomy and freedom. As Christians (2005, p. 139) points out, 
the Enlightenment brought about a radical disjunction between “hard facts and 
subjective values,” isolating reason from faith, and knowledge from belief. This view 
was expressed, for example, upon the foundation of London’s Royal Society when 
Robert Hooke noted in 1663 that in seeking to “improve the knowledge of natural 
things, this Society will not meddle with Divinity, Metaphysics, Morals, Politics and 
Rhetoric” (Lyons, 1944, p. 42 cited in Christians, 2005, p. 139). Enlightenment 
thinkers believed that rather than the state dictating how its citizens should live their 
lives individuals should be guided by their own ideas and beliefs. Science, and later 
social science, were seen as having an important role to play in discovering objective, 
impartial and value-free facts about the human condition which could inform social 
and political decision-making. Key thinkers such as Comte, Mill and Weber saw 
science and social science as neutral and amoral, and political only in their 
application. Despite differences in their views, all advocated a morally neutral social 
science—premised on a facts-values distinction—as a means of securing political and 
personal autonomy (Christians, 2005). 
 
Humanism is therefore a celebration of human reason, autonomy and free will, 
including intellectual and moral freedom. This anthropocentric perspective is 
underpinned by a commitment to human exceptionalism, and the presupposition that 
their capacity for rational thought makes human beings essentially different from all 
other kinds of beings.4 In giving humans privileged status, humanism relies on an 
essentialist conception of the human being and human nature. More generally, it 
presupposes an essentialist ontology by taking the existence and identity of all 
beings—and the differences between them—as given. Heidegger (1998, p. 245) takes 
up this issue in his Letter on Humanism when he notes that varied interpretations of 
humanism assume not only an already determined essence of the human being, but 
also “an already established interpretation of nature, history, world, and the ground of 
the world, that is, of beings as a whole”. Heidegger’s point is that humanist 
philosophies presuppose an elaborate ontology or metaphysics—including a 
historically established notion of the essence of the human—without acknowledging 
this starting assumption.  
 
For the purposes of this discussion, then, I identify humanism as a philosophical 
worldview that is anthropocentric and believes in human exceptionalism; that is 
underpinned by an essentialist ontology in which the world is understood to be 
populated with a metaphysical foundation of fixed, unchanging, pre-existing and 
‘naturally given’ entities (including but not restricted to human beings); that assumes 
that human knowers can discover foundational truths through the application of 
reason; and that subscribes to a hierarchical and dualist distinction between facts and 
values in which truthful, certain or factual knowledge of the world is separate from, 
precedes, and provides support and justification for, further derivative knowledge 
such as moral and ethical claims.  
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A humanist ethics 
 
The ways we conceptualize morality and practice research ethics in the social 
sciences, and elsewhere, are humanist legacies to the extent that they have been 
developed within the context of these dominant humanist philosophies and the 
ontological primacy they give to the human; their privileging of the rational human 
subject as primary holder of moral agency and responsibility; and their enshrinement 
of human autonomy and rights as key foci of ethical concern. In this section, I briefly 
discuss different aspects of moral philosophy to give a sense of this intellectual 
inheritance, including how it shapes ethical practice and how we approach the ethics 
of Big Data. 
 
Within a Western tradition, ethics is understood as a distinctive branch of 
philosophy—moral philosophy—that concerns itself with the science or study of 
morality, with questions of what is right and wrong, and with the problematic of how 
we ought to live our lives.5 It is divided into three areas: meta-ethics, normative 
ethics, and applied ethics (Wolff, 2017). Meta-ethics is the most abstract area of 
moral philosophy. It concerns itself with the philosophical question of what morality 
is, and explores the ontological status, foundations, and scope of moral values, 
properties, and words. For example, while some philosophers (moral realists or 
objectivists) claim that moral facts have a real and objective existence that is 
independent of any beliefs or evidence about them, others (moral relativists or 
subjectivists) suggest that individuals and cultures create moral values in diverse ways 
(Wolff, 2017). In this formulation, morality is taken to be either ‘naturally given’ 
awaiting human discovery or it is understood as a cultural elaboration constructed by 
humans. Despite their differences, both perspectives can be characterized as humanist 
in that they assume the prior existence of (1) moral facts or values, and (2) already 
constituted human rational subjects who either discover moral facts or construct moral 
values. 
 
Normative and applied ethics both focus on the question of what is moral. Normative 
ethics is concerned with providing a moral framework and set of guiding ethical 
principles to inform moral behaviour. It explores what values and norms should 
inform moral decision-making, and how these can be justified. There are three main 
traditions in normative ethics (Wolff, 2017). Virtue ethics emphasizes cultivation of 
the virtues, or inherent moral character, of a person and is associated with Aristotle. 
Utilitarianism focuses on the consequences of actions. It holds that an action is 
morally right if it leads to the most happiness for the greatest number of people. In 
this view, human happiness is the foundation of all morality. Classic proponents were 
Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Sidgwick (Christians, 2005). 
Deontology emphasizes moral duties and rules. The rightness or wrongness of actions 
depends on whether humans fulfil their duty by following universal moral laws. A 
prominent example is Kant’s ethics. It roots morality in humanity’s rational capacity, 
and asserts the existence of a supreme and universal principle of morality, ‘The 
Categorical Imperative,’ which determines what our moral duties are. While virtue 
ethics, utilitarianism and deontology are regarded as the main ethical theories, they 
have not gone unchallenged. One example is the ethic of care proposed by Gilligan 
(1982), which emphasizes the importance of human interdependence and relationship 
as both an ethical goal and as a central element of moral decision-making. Despite 
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their differences, these contrasting ethical theories share humanist assumptions; for 
example, in the unconditional value of human rationality and free will found in Kant’s 
ethics, or the understanding of moral reasoning as exact calculation based on rational 
choice theory associated with utilitarianism, or the privileging of human relationships 
in the ethic of care. 
 
Applied ethics uses principles and insights from normative ethics to resolve specific 
moral issues in concrete and particular settings (e.g. medical ethics, business ethics) 
(Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009). Social science research ethics is an example of 
applied ethics. Two fundamental ethical questions have guided social science research 
ethics (Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009; Punch, 1994). The first deals with the moral and 
ethical aspects related to the purpose and conduct of research itself. It asks: what is 
the ethically proper way to collect, process and report research data? The second, 
which has received more attention, relates to how social scientists should behave with 
respect to their research subjects. In addressing these two questions, researchers are 
guided by professional codes of ethical conduct. These prescribe and proscribe certain 
values and ways of acting, including ensuring the accuracy and validity of data, 
seeking informed consent, ensuring anonymity and confidentiality, safeguarding 
research participants against harm, avoiding deception, and risk–benefit evaluation 
(Kitchener & Kitchener, 2009; Christians, 2005).6 
 
The ethical principles of autonomy, beneficence, non-maleficence and justice that 
underpin modern Western research involving human subjects and its codes of ethical 
conduct rely on a series of humanist assumptions about what makes human beings 
both unique—e.g. their dignity and rights—and distinctive from non-human entities 
(e.g. animals, machines, inanimate objects). These humanist foundations are apparent, 
for example, in the human-centric nature of ethical concerns within social science 
research, and their focus on respecting research participants’ rights to information, 
self-determination, dignity, and privacy; and protecting them from physical, 
emotional, psychological and/or moral harm. They are evident in the commitment to 
individual autonomy, human freedom, and rational decision-making that underpins 
the practice of informed consent. And they can be seen in the ways in which social 
science research ethics frames moral agency as a human concern located with 
researchers and their ethical responsibilities towards science, society, and the human 
subjects taking part in their research.  
 
As already indicated, this normative moral framework, including its conceptualization 
of social science research ethics, is contested. For example, social scientists, 
qualitative researchers, and feminist scholars have voiced concern with the growth of 
research ethics regulation and governance; the perceived inappropriate imposition of a 
biomedical model of research ethics onto the social sciences; the limitations of 
abstract universal ethical principles compared to flexible, contextual, situational and 
relational ethical practices; and the use of technocratic approaches to research ethics 
(e.g. Dingwall, 2006; Edwards & Mauthner, 2012; Haggerty, 2004; Hedgecoe, 2008; 
Miller et al., 2012; Shrag, 2010; Stark, 2011; van den Hoonaard & Hamilton, 2016). 
Critics have also argued that the ethical conduct of research lies as much in political, 
epistemological, theoretical and methodological practices, as it does in ethical ones 
(Clegg & Slife, 2009). In particular, postmodern approaches to ethical practice 
eschew the distinction between the research process and research ethics; recognize 
that research is laden with values, assumptions, and perspectives; and sees “research 
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as an inherently ethical enterprise” (Clegg & Slife, 2009, p. 36). Ethical research, they 
suggest, is politically engaged, epistemologically situated, and methodologically 
reflexive. And these ethical commitments, it is argued, can be put into practice 
through more reflexive, collaborative, relational, inclusive, participatory, and 
empowering research designs and knowledge construction processes (e.g. Brabeck & 
Brabeck, 2009). Nevertheless, these critical ethical projects remain situated within a 
humanist framework that continues to privilege the human subject as locus of 
epistemological and moral agency, and focus of ethical concern. Clegg and Slife 
(2009, p. 36), for example, argue that a postmodern ethics requires “an insistent self-
examination” and reflexive approach on the part of the researcher, as well as an “an 
unflinching sensitivity” to our relation with the research participant. Thus, while 
normative ethical approaches have been contested, their critiques re-inscribe humanist 
assumptions with a supposedly pre-existing human subject remaining the 
fountainhead of ethical agency and responsibility, as well as the object of ethical care 
and concern.  
 
The purpose of this first half of the paper has been to situate the ethical concerns 
raised by Big Data, and its uptake within qualitative research, within a broader 
humanist framework and humanist ethics—to show that the ways in which we think 
about the ethics of Big Data, the challenges it raises, and how we might address these 
are all rooted within a very specific humanist understanding of morality and ethics. 
Drawing on emerging posthumanist philosophies, I now move on to explore a 
different understanding of ethics before returning to the question of what this might 
entail for a posthumanist ethics of qualitative research in a Big Data era. The point of 
this discussion is not to suggest that a posthumanist ethical approach to Big Data is 
better or more ethical than a humanist ethics. Rather, I argue that humanist and 
posthumanist approaches to ethics are rooted within distinctive philosophical 
worldviews, focus on distinctive matters of ethical concern, and therefore configure 
the ethics of Big Data in different ways. 
 
Posthumanist philosophies 
 
Over recent years, posthumanist theories have joined other intellectual traditions—
such as poststructuralism, postmodernism, postcolonial studies, feminist studies and 
cultural studies—in critically deconstructing the legacies of humanist philosophies. 
Coming from wide ranging disciplinary backgrounds—including philosophy, science 
and technology studies, literary studies, critical theory, theoretical sociology and 
communication studies (Bolter, 2016)—and encompassing distinctive theoretical 
approaches, posthumanist scholars are seeking to rethink and rework the humanist 
assumptions underpinning modern Western philosophy and science (Ferrando, 2013; 
Miah, 2009) including notions of: an autonomous human subject; a pre-given ‘human 
nature’; scientific reason; objective and value-free knowledge and truth; universal 
laws of nature or morality; and a metaphysics of essence and presence.  
 
The specific posthumanist approach I take up in this article—associated in particular 
with the work of feminist science studies scholars Karen Barad and Donna 
Haraway7—takes a critical stance towards traditional Western humanism in three 
ways that are of relevance to our discussion of a posthumanist ethics, and its 
implications for the ethics of Big Data. The first challenges the alleged sovereignty of 
the human autonomous subject, its hierarchical relation to the non-human realm, and 
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the human exceptionalism it is granted by virtue of its supposedly unique capacity for 
reason, including moral reasoning (Barad, 2007; Braidotti, 2013; Haraway, 2008; 
Wolfe, 2009). The object of posthumanist critique here are foundational 
anthropocentric assumptions underpinning Western philosophy and science whereby 
the rational and intentional human subject is seen as the locus of epistemological and 
moral agency, responsibility and accountability. In terms of research ethics this 
dimension of posthumanism presents a challenge to the idea that ethics consists in 
autonomous individual human subjects—researchers and research participants—
making ethical decisions on the basis of intentional rational thinking (such as 
researchers seeking their research subjects’ informed consent).  
 
A second and broader concern is a refusal to bestow ontological priority, primacy, 
superiority or separateness on to any ontological being, let alone the human (Barad, 
2007). This variant of posthumanism calls into question the assumed given-ness of all 
beings, and the essentialist and dualist ontology that underpins much of Western 
philosophy and science. It eschews the representationalist notion that reality consists 
of pre-existing, and distinctive, entities or categories (such as ‘human’ vs 
‘nonhuman’, ‘culture’ vs ‘nature’, ‘values’ vs ‘facts’) awaiting human discovery and 
representation. Rather, it proposes a performative understanding of world/knowledge-
making practices in which the latter are implicated in the constitution of reality. These 
practices neither put us in touch with naturally given entities; nor do they produce 
social constructions of the world. Rather, they “play a role in producing the very 
phenomena they set out to describe” (Barad, 2007, p. 207). Knowledge-making 
practices help make their objects of study by giving them determinate and specific 
ontological form. Whereas humanism assumes that the ontological nature of the world 
is a matter that has already been settled, posthumanist philosophies take as their key 
problematic the question of what and how entities come into being in the first place. 
World-making practices can never be innocent or neutral because they make the 
world in privileged ways by bringing specific (i.e. valued) entities, and their binary 
others (e.g. ‘human’ vs. ‘non-human’), into being. It is in this sense that world-
making practices are understood as necessarily ethical because they make the world in 
morally and politically consequential ways. On a posthumanist approach, there is no 
separation between finding out about the world (the realm of knowledge), and 
ensuring that no harm is done in the course of such an investigation (the realm of 
ethics). Rather, there is ethical duty and responsibility in knowledge/world-making 
itself. Knowledge-production is an inherently ethical matter.  
 
Third, posthumanism deconstructs both the liberal subject found at the centre of 
humanist philosophies—including philosophies of science and moral philosophies—
and the essentialist ontology that underpins these philosophical traditions by calling 
them to account.
8
 Its concern is with justifying the ontological constitution of entities 
and boundaries, such as the ‘human’ vs. the ‘nonhuman’, or ‘nature’ vs. ‘culture’. 
Following Barad (2007, p. 136), posthumanism is “the practice of accounting for the 
boundary-making practices by which the “human” and its others are differentially 
delineated and defined”. Significantly, however, this is not a reflexive accounting in 
which the human subject accounts for the social construction of reality, and the 
effects of theory, culture, history or subjectivity on knowledge. This position assumes 
the pre-existence and centrality of human agency and re-inscribes a priori distinctions 
between ‘nature’ and ‘culture’ through the notion of an already formed material world 
that is socially constructed by an already constituted human subject (Barad, 2003). 
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Rather, posthumanism (as elaborated in this article) assumes that the world is 
ontologically indeterminate outside of specific practices and entails knowledge 
practices accounting for themselves and their world-making effects. The 
consequential effects of world-making practices is what demands their moral 
justification. Posthumanism takes this accounting or justificatory practice as its prime 
ethical concern; and conceptualizes this practice in other than humanist terms. 
Posthumanist interventions attempt to move beyond social constructivist approaches, 
reflexive accounting practices, and the notion that truth claims mask particular human 
interests in local, cultural and political struggles. The posthumanist argument is 
therefore distinctive to the postmodern claim that human subjects (and cultures) make 
the world, create knowledge, engage in ethical practices and reflexively account for 
their practices. As already indicated, posthumanism seeks to conceptualize 
ontological, epistemological and ethical agency without recourse to the human 
subject. In this respect, posthumanist interventions are carving out trajectories that are 
distinctive, albeit indebted, to critical projects that have come before them.  
 
A posthumanist ethics  
 
As indicated above a posthumanist ethics is distinctive to conventional—and what I 
characterizing as humanist—approaches to ethics.9 On a posthumanist approach there 
is no intentional human subject at the helm of knowledge projects and ethical decision 
making. Rather, ethical (and ontological and epistemological) agency is located with 
practices of inquiry and their performative effects. The object of ethical concern is not 
humans but the world-making powers of practices of inquiry—their ability to bring 
specific configurations of the world into existence. It is in this sense that ethics is seen 
as inseparable from knowledge making, and is understood as responsibility and 
accountability for the performative effects of knowledge practices—where 
responsibility and accountability are conceptualized in other than humanist terms. In 
this section I further flesh out these points by: first, introducing Foucault’s concept of 
the ‘apparatus’ as a means of conceptualizing agency without recourse to the human 
subject; second, discussing Haraway and Barad’s notion of the ‘apparatus of bodily 
production’ to theorize the performativity, and world-making powers, of apparatuses; 
and third, further drawing on Haraway and Barad to articulate a posthumanist ethics 
as ethical accountability for apparatus of bodily production, and their performative 
effects. In the final section of the article I build on these insights to begin to develop a 
posthumanist ethics of Big Data. 
 
Foucault’s ‘apparatus’ as a means of conceptualising posthumanist agency 
 
Foucault’s (1980) concept of the ‘apparatus’ provides a way of conceptualizing 
agency beyond the human subject, with the apparatus becoming the locus of 
knowledge-making. In The Confession of the Flesh, Foucault (1980) elaborates on his 
use of the term ‘apparatus’ (translated from the French dispositif). The concept, he 
suggests, provides a way of speaking about a complex formation or system of 
discursive and non-discursive practices, elements and relations. It includes “a 
thoroughly heterogeneous ensemble consisting of discourses, institutions, 
architectural forms, regulatory decisions, laws, administrative measures, scientific 
statements, philosophical, moral and philanthropic propositions—in short, the said as 
much as the unsaid” (Foucault, 1980, p. 194). The nature, meaning and function of 
these heterogeneous elements are not fixed but vary along with the nature of the 
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connection that exists between them. In this way, “a particular discourse can figure at 
one time as the programme of an institution, and at another it can function as a means 
of justifying or masking a practice which itself remains silent, or as a secondary re-
interpretation of this practice, opening out for it a new field of rationality” (Foucault, 
1980, p. 194-195). The main strategic function of the apparatus is to respond to an 
“urgent need” (Foucault, 1980, p. 195) at a given historical moment. There is, 
Foucault suggests, a strategic imperative that acts as the matrix for an apparatus.  
 
The concept of the apparatus provides Foucault (1966/2005, p. xiv) with a way of 
addressing what he refers to elsewhere as “the problem of the subject”. In The Order 
of Things, Foucault seeks to tell a history of the human sciences without recourse to 
an intentional meta- or trans-historic human subject. He wants to undertake a 
historical analysis guided by “a theory of discursive practice” rather than “a theory of 
the knowing subject” (Foucault, 1966/2005, p. xiii). His objective is to retrace the 
“spontaneous movement of an anonymous body of knowledge” (Foucault, 1966/2005, 
p. xiv) and “its conditions of existence, its changes, the errors it has perpetrated, the 
sudden advances that have sent it off on a new course” (Foucault, 1966/2005, p. xiv) 
all “without reference to the scientist himself” (Foucault, 1966/2005, p. xiv). 
Specifically, he rejects the phenomenological approach “which gives absolute priority 
to the observing subject, which attributes a constituent role to an act, which places its 
own point of view at the origin of all historicity—which, in short, leads to a 
transcendental consciousness” (Foucault, 1966/2005, p. xiii). Conceptualizing the 
human sciences—or in the case of this article Big Data as a means of knowledge 
production—as an apparatus opens up the possibility of exploring its history in terms 
of the role of, and relations between, “instruments, techniques, institutions, events, 
ideologies, and interests” (Foucault, 1966/2005, p. xiii). Foucault suggests that it is 
through this apparatus, and its underlying logic, rationality, rules and systems of 
regularities, that the human sciences constitute their very existence and historical 
trajectory. In the final section of the article I will discuss how conceptualizing Big 
Data as an ‘apparatus’ provides a non-anthropocentric way of thinking about the 
nature, effects, and ethics of the phenomenon of Big Data. 
 
Haraway and Barad’s ‘apparatus of bodily production’ as a means of 
conceptualising the posthumanist performativity of apparatuses 
 
Feminist science studies scholars, Haraway and Barad, flesh out the ontological 
nature, performative effects and ethical dimensions of the apparatus through their 
concept of the ‘apparatus of bodily production’. On their account, agency is located 
with the apparatus’s ongoing materialization of itself, and not with a human subject as 
driver of the apparatus. The human subject neither precedes nor is separate from the 
apparatus, but rather is one of its many constitutive effects. The human subject and 
human agency do not simply disappear from their posthumanist metaphysics and 
ethics. Rather, they are both implicated in and performative effects of apparatuses.   
 
In Situated Knowledges, Haraway (1988) introduces ‘the apparatus of bodily 
production’ as a means of developing her feminist theory of embodied objectivity, 
situated knowledges, and non-innocent world-making. With this concept, Haraway 
(1988, p. 595) specifies the “material-semiotic” nature of embodiment; that is, a 
conceptualization of both the bodies that are produced and how they are produced. 
Embodiment, she suggests, designates neither an inert material substance—“organic 
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embodiment”—nor its “technological mediation” (1988, p. 581). Nor is the notion of 
material-semiotic used in additive terms to imply the combining of already constituted 
material entities with already constituted semiotic elements (see Mauthner, 2018, p. 
58-60). Rather, the material and the semiotic are understood as ontologically 
inseparable and mutually constitutive. In Barad’s terms, the relation between the 
material and the semiotic is an intra-active rather than interactive one (see below).10 
On this account, embodied objectivity entails a material-semiotic apparatus intra-
actively bringing material-semiotic objects into existence.  
 
Haraway (1988, p. 593) further uses the notion of the apparatus of bodily production 
as a means of conceptualizing the agency of the bodies that are produced; i.e. the 
apparatus’s objects of knowledge. She rejects the objectification of the world as “raw 
material for our humanization”: the assumption that the world is already given and 
can speak for itself once it has been discovered and decoded by human knowers and 
their knowledge projects. Situated knowledges grant agency to the “objects” of the 
world. This agency, however, is not understood in classical humanist terms: it is 
neither located with human subjects—it is “independent of intentions and authors” 
(Haraway, 1988, p. 595)—nor with/in pre-existing entities or objects. Rather, agency 
is conceptualized as the on-going materialization of bodies and ontological processes 
of materialization (see also Barad, 2007). In Haraway’s (1988, p. 595) words, “bodies 
as objects of knowledge are material-semiotic generative nodes”. Objects of 
knowledge materialize with and through boundary-drawing practices—i.e. 
apparatuses—which are also material-semiotic generative nodes continually and 
dynamically making and remaking themselves. Following Haraway and Barad, the 
nature and configuration of the world a e ‘phenomenal’: the world materializes itself 
into existence, and into specific forms, only with and as specific entangled 
apparatuses of bodily production, where the latter are also understood to be 
‘phenomenal’. Apparatuses (enacted through material-discursive devices and 
practices of inquiry) are understood as inseparable and constitutive parts of the 
objects (and subjects) they help to produce. Following Barad, the referent for 
practices of inquiry—the ‘object’ that these practices make determinate and 
intelligible—is a ‘phenomenon’: entangled, inseparable and mutually constitutive 
practices-objects, rather than an independently existing object. Objects of study do not 
exist as determinate givens outside of phenomena. Rather, they are “phenomenal” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 315). In the social sciences, this implies for example that research 
practices, such as Big Data practices, “neither discover pre-existing identities, nor do 
they provide interpretations or constructions of these identities. Rather, research 
practices, along with many other kinds of practices, help constitute specific kinds of 
identities (humans, animals, machines) as well as specific categories of human 
identities (men, women, White, Asian, Black, working-class, middle-class, and so 
on)” (Mauthner, 2018, p. 52). 
 
Through their practice, apparatuses therefore bring into being not only specific 
‘objects’ of study but also specific configurations of themselves (see Mauthner, 2016). 
To reiterate, the focus is not on how (separate and already constituted) human 
researchers deploy (separate and already constituted) apparatuses (or material-
discursive practices of inquiry which may be philosophical, theoretical, 
methodological, or ethical) to discover pre-existing worlds. Rather, apparatuses 
materialize phenomena, that is, specific, intra-active and inseparable configurations of 
practices of inquiry and their objects of study. Barad’s posthumanist performative 
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conceptualization of practices of inquiry as material-discursive world-making 
practices therefore undermines the classical understanding of knowledge-making as an 
anthropocentric epistemological project. It dethrones the human as the locus of 
knowledge and puts in its place material-discursive practices and their performative 
world-making (onto-epistemological), rather than just knowledge-making 
(epistemological), powers and effects. 
 
On my reading of Barad’s work, the material-discursive specificity of world-making 
practices comes from the specific philosophical, moral and political commitments they 
embody and enact. These values, however, are not taken as already constituted cultural 
entities that are separate from fact-finding practices and that are drawn upon by human 
researchers to engage in reflexive practices of inquiry. Rather, these values are 
understood as ontologically indeterminate outside of the material-discursive world-
making (and much wider) practices through which they are materialized. Values and 
world-making practices therefore co-constitute one another and come into being 
together. This means that practices of inquiry can never be ontologically, 
epistemologically, morally or politically innocent or neutral. They necessarily perform 
themselves in metaphysically-specific ways. It follows that world-making practices 
perform not only themselves, but also their objects of study, in metaphysical 
configurations that embody and enact specific values. As Barad (Juelskjær & 
Schwennesen, 2012, p. 15) notes, “If phenomena, not things, are the objective referent 
then the apparatus that produces data and things also produces values and meanings”.  
 
Following Barad, world-making practices are therefore necessarily ethical because it 
is through these practices that values—as well as bodies and meanings—are 
actualized and come to matter (Juelskjær & Schwennesen, 2012, p. 15). Barad’s 
(2007, p. 185) metaphysics undermines the facts-values distinction and characterizes 
practices and apparatuses as inseparably “ethico-onto-epistemological”. Engaging in 
any world-making practice—philosophical, theoretical, methodological, ethical—is 
an ethical matter in itself. Ethics inheres in the very practices of inquiry, and not 
simply in codified norms and rules of ethical conduct. Engaging in knowledge/world-
making practices entails ethical duty, responsibility and accountability for the real 
ontological, epistemological, ethical, and political world-making consequences of 
enacting metaphysically-specific practices of inquiry. Importantly, while it is a human 
subject that engages in these practices, this subject is not understood as pre-existing 
these practices but rather as intra-actively coming into being with them (see below). 
By extension, ethical agency and responsibility are not understood as located with/in 
an already constituted moral agent but rather as materialising with/through specific 
world-making practices, along with human subjects and objects of inquiry. All of 
these are regarded as ‘phenomenal’.  
 
A key question in developing a posthumanist ethics of Big Data is how to 
conceptualize moral agency without locating it with a pre-existing, intentional and 
rational human subject. Conceptualizing Big Data as an apparatus of bodily 
production provides a way of theorizing the ontological, epistemological and moral 
agency of Big Data other than in terms of a human subject. Big Data can be 
understood as an apparatus of bodily production whose multiple practices are 
implicated in the ‘data’ they produce. Big Data practices do not innocently find 
patterns of pre-existing meanings within data; rather, they help to produce them. The 
implications for an ethics of Big Data is to locate ethics with the performative effects 
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of data practices; with the power of these practices to constitute, and not simply 
represent, the world. 
 
A posthumanist ethics as ethical accountability of apparatus and their performative 
effects 
 
Haraway (1988) takes issue with classical objectivity understood as the “god trick of 
seeing everything from nowhere” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581): “a conquering gaze … 
that makes the unmarked category claim the power to see and not be seen, to 
represent while escaping representation” (Haraway, 1988, p. 581). In contrast to 
notions of transcendental and disembodied knowledge, and the splitting of subject and 
object, Haraway proposes “embodied, therefore accountable, objectivity” (Haraway, 
1988, p. 588) as a means of conceptualizing the situated, partial and locatable nature 
of knowledge production—its particularity, specificity and non-innocence (Haraway, 
1991, p. 124). This, Haraway suggests, is a way of producing knowledge that “allows 
us to become answerable for what we learn how to see” (Haraway, 1988, p. 583). 
Barad (2007, p. 340) makes a similar point when she redefines objectivity as “a 
matter of accountability to marks on bodies” and the specificity of these marks and 
the objects that they produce. Haraway is not simply arguing that situated knowledges 
and embodied objectivity provide new epistemological ways of understanding the 
construction of knowledge. She is making a much stronger ontological claim that 
embodied objectivity and situated knowledges are practices that produce not only 
knowledge but also reality, and it is through their world-making powers that practices 
acquire ethical agency and responsibility. For Haraway (1988, p. 583), scientific 
objectivity as classically understood constitutes irresponsible knowledge and 
scientific practice. Haraway’s argument for situated and embodied knowledges is 
therefore a stance “against various forms of unlocatable, and so irresponsible, 
knowledge claims” (1988, p. 583). Barad (2007, p. 37) elaborates on this point: 
 
Objectivity is simultaneously an epistemological, ontological, and axiological 
issue, and questions of responsibility and accountability lie at the core of 
scientific practice. The correct identification of the objective referent of 
scientific practices of theorizing and experimenting requires an accounting of 
the ethical (as well as epistemological and ontological) concerns. It is not 
possible to extricate oneself from ethical concerns and correctly discern what 
science tells us about the world. Realism, then, is not about representations of 
an independent reality but about the real consequences, interventions, creative 
possibilities, and responsibilities of intra-acting within and as part of the 
world. 
 
Significantly, neither Barad nor Haraway conceptualize answerability, responsibility 
and accountability in humanist terms. It is not the human knower who is responsible, 
answerable and accountable for what is produced. Consequently, Haraway’s ‘partial’ 
and ‘situated’ knowledge is not a social constructivist epistemology that requires 
reflexive positioning on the part of the knower through specification of personal, 
social, demographic, political, theoretical, cultural, and historical coordinates. Rather, 
there is a more complex causality at work here whereby the human knower is both 
implicated in, and a relational and performative effect of, knowledge production 
systems and apparatuses. In Barad’s terms (2007), the human knower is one of many 
‘bodies’ (i.e. ontological entities) that is ‘intra-actively’ (see below) produced through 
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knowledge/world-making practices. This means that while humans, and their 
scientific instruments and practices, play a part in bringing the world into existence 
and rendering it intelligible, they “are not the only active beings—though this is never 
justification for deflecting our responsibility onto others” (Barad, 2007, p. 391). When 
Haraway suggests that ‘we’ are answerable for what ‘we’ learn to see, she is therefore 
not invoking an already formed and pre-existing human subject that precedes, 
accounts and is responsible for its actions in the world as if it is “separate from the 
intra-active becoming of the world” (Barad, 2007, p. 394). Rather, this is a subject 
that ‘becomes with’ (Haraway, 2008) knowledge apparatuses (see also Butler, 1993, 
1997). Indeed, Barad (2007, p. 33) introduces the neologism, ‘intra-action’, precisely 
to convey an ontological notion of causality that is fundamentally different to the 
more familiar concept of inter-action: 
 
“intra-action” signifies the mutual constitution of entangled agencies. That is, 
in contrast to the usual “interaction”, which assumes that there are separate 
individual agencies that precede their interaction, the notion of intra-action 
recognizes that distinct agencies do not precede, but rather emerge through, 
their intra-action. It is important to note that the “distinct” agencies are only 
distinct in a relational, not an absolute, sense, that is, agencies are only distinct 
in relation to their mutual entanglement; they don’t exist as individual 
elements. 
 
Posthumanism therefore promises an understanding of human agency that can be 
reduced neither to free will nor to determinism; and a notion of moral agency and 
responsibility that is therefore located neither simply with, nor outside of, human 
beings.  
 
On Haraway’s (1988, p. 587) approach, situated knowledge and positioning imply 
“responsibility for our enabling practices” where this entails understanding how 
knowledge-producing systems—or the ‘apparatuses’ that Foucault (1966/2005) has in 
mind—work “technically, socially, and physically” (Haraway, 1988, p. 583). Barad 
(2007, p. 390) further explains that: 
 
the responsible practice of science requires a full genealogical accounting of 
the entangled apparatuses or practices that produce particular phenomena. In 
contrast to more traditional conceptions of objectivity, which are only 
responsible to the norms of correct practice as narrowly conceived (e.g., the 
correct operation of equipment, the production of determinate marks on 
bodies, the following of standards of interpretation, the following of correct 
procedures for reporting results), objectivity in an agential realist sense 
requires a full accounting of the larger material arrangements (i.e., the full set 
of practices) that is a part of the phenomena investigated or produced. 
 
For both Haraway and Barad it is the unavoidable power of, and violence implicit in, 
knowledge-making apparatuses that is called to account. The key moral and indeed 
political issue is accounting for the power of apparatuses to bring specific realities 
into being to the exclusion of others. Embodied, situated and accountable knowledge 
necessarily entails affirmation of non-innocent commitments. This kind of 
knowledge-making neither rejects commitments nor presumes their innocence. This 
echoes Derrida’s (1995) point, in Archive Fever, when he notes that the classificatory 
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concepts and systems through which archival content is both organized and 
ontologically made—for example, whether a record is classified as ‘theory or ‘private 
correspondence,’ ‘biography’ or ‘autobiography’—cannot be avoided as without them 
“no archive would ever come into play or exist as such” (Derrida 1995, p. 3). For 
Derrida, the issue is that the politics and “violence” (Derrida 1995, p. 7) through 
which the archive must be, and is inevitably, constituted is naturalized and forgotten, 
rather than accounted for (see Mauthner and Gárdos, 2015).  
 
It is in this sense that, following Barad, we are partly but not wholly responsible for 
the bodies, meanings and values produced through knowledge/world-making 
practices and apparatuses more generally. On my reading, it is this non-
anthropocentric and performative move that Barad (2007, p. 36) is proposing through 
her posthumanist “ethics of mattering,” in both senses of the word: world-making 
practices matter because they help materialize the world in ways that are significant 
and make a difference. The ethical practice of inquiry therefore requires “an ethics of 
responsibility and accountability not only for what we know, how we know, and what 
we do but, in part, for what exists” (Barad, 2007, p. 243). It demands a practice that 
takes responsibility and accounts for its world-making/constitutive powers (for their 
ability to materialize specific ‘phenomena’), where these practices are understood as 
neither simply human, nor given, nor ours alone. Following Haraway and Barad, 
accounting for the ‘phenomenal’ nature of reality—for the mutually constitutive 
relation between apparatuses and the material-semiotic bodies they produce, including 
human subjects and objects of inquiry—is an ethical matter and ethical practice. A 
posthumanist ethical practice of inquiry is a practice that accounts for its own 
ontological existence, commitments and effects (Mauthner, 2018). Posthumanism 
therefore does not simply reject the notion of human subjectivity, agency, 
responsibility or accountability. Rather, it refuses to take these as a priori givens and 
insists instead that they are intra-active effects of specific practices and apparatuses 
and as such must be accounted for.  
 
On my reading, a posthumanist ethical and responsible practice of inquiry is a 
practice that accounts for itself as an apparatus of bodily production: that justifies its 
own existence and assumptions, and its performative role in bringing specific entities 
into the world (such as ‘the human subject’). In terms of an ethics of Big Data, the 
object of ethical concern from a posthumanist perspective is Big Data’s claims to 
represent the world truthfully and innocently; that is, its failure to account for, and 
make explicit, its positivist philosophy of science and associated practices. The 
implications for an ethics of Big Data is that it must account for its own practices and 
the data these produce, where this justification is not a humanist reflexive practice but 
a posthumanist accounting of the apparatus of Big Data, a point I return to below. 
 
Towards a posthumanist ethics of qualitative research in a Big Data era 
 
I now move on to consider what this posthumanist ethics might entail for qualitative 
research in a Big Data era. First, I suggest that the practice of qualitative research in a 
Big Data era can be conceptualized in posthumanist terms through the concept of the 
‘apparatus of bodily production’. Second, I argue that the posthumanist ethical 
concerns raised by qualitative research in a Big Data era relate to the 
representationalist practices and discourses associated with the Big Data movement. 
In particular, Big Data’s constitution of itself in instrumentalist, empiricist and 
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positivist terms—as seen in its treatment of data as given, self-evident and ‘speaking 
for themselves’—naturalizes precisely those practices of Big Data’s apparatus of 
bodily production that posthumanism insists must be accounted for. Third, I propose 
that a posthumanist ethical practice of qualitative research in a Big Data era is a 
practice of ‘genealogically accounting’ (Barad, 2007) for the apparatus and its 
performative effects. 
 
Qualitative research in a Big Data era as an apparatus of bodily production 
 
Conceptualizing qualitative research in a Big Data era as an apparatus of bodily 
production entails identifying a complex, entangled and heterogenous system of inter 
alia practices, policies, principles, technologies, instruments, infrastructures, methods, 
techniques, tools, archives, norms, values, ethics, regulations, laws, institutions, and 
discourses—and their underlying rationalities—through which the entity ‘qualitative 
research in a Big Data era’ on-goingly constitutes itself and its objects of study. This 
includes, for example, the specific ways in which qualitative research—its identity 
and philosophical, methodological and ethical practices—is (re)constituting itself with 
the emergence of Big Data. As with qualitative research, Big Data is not taken to be a 
unified or fixed concept or entity (see also Kitchin & McArdle, 2016). Rather, it is 
understood as an ontologically dynamic phenomenon on-goingly (re)making itself as 
part of a longer history of social statistics and other methodologies, and in relation to 
broader forms of governance, political economy, rationality and reasoning (see Beer, 
2016). This apparatus is a dynamic system that has a life and momentum of its own; 
that propels itself forward not so much independently of human intervention but in 
intra-action with it. This means that while humans, and their projects, are implicated 
in this apparatus—for example, through the development and implementation of 
policies, methods, infrastructures, technologies, and so on—they do not precede, but 
rather come into being with, this apparatus. In this sense, the entangled elements of 
this apparatus constitute the material-discursive practicalities, possibilities and 
constraints through which qualitative research in a Big Data era, including its 
practices, practitioners and objects/subjects of study, are materialized and rendered 
meaningful. This conceptualization provides a way of thinking about what the 
phenomenon of Big Data is and does without simply placing human subjects as 
responsible for Big Data’s ontological nature, epistemological claims and ethical 
effects. 
 
Posthumanist ethical concerns raised by qualitative research in a Big Data era 
 
On a posthumanist approach, a key matter of ethical concern is humanism’s—and the 
apparatuses and practices it gives rise to—abrogation of responsibility for itself and 
its constitutive effects on the world. As Haraway (1988, p. 581) suggests, practices 
that “claim the power to see and not be seen, to represent while escaping 
representation” constitute irresponsible knowledge-making. This posthumanist 
perspective therefore positions the humanist philosophical assumptions and 
commitments that underpin qualitative research in a Big Data era—and all elements 
of this apparatus—as ethical concerns. Significantly, it opens up the possibility of 
foregrounding dominant positivist, empiricist and representationalist understandings 
of Big Data science—and associated qualitative research practices and 
methodologies—as matters requiring ethical, and not simply philosophical, attention.  
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Several commentators have noted that the Big Data phenomenon appears to be 
reinforcing particular philosophical understandings of science and social science 
(boyd & Crawford 2012; Kitchin, 2014b). For example, much of the literature on Big 
Data assumes that these data ‘speak for themselves’ (e.g. Mayer-Schönberger & 
Cukier, 2013) and reflect the objective nature of reality. Many see the messy, fluid, 
networked and real- or near-real time features of Big Data as providing direct and 
immediate access to the messy, fluid and networked nature of the real world as it 
unfolds through time. Indeed, Big Data are highly prized precisely for these 
ostensibly naturalistic qualities. As Zwitter (2014, p. 2) suggests, “by collecting 
everything that is digitally available, Big Data represents reality digitally much more 
naturally than statistical data—in this sense it is much more organic. This messiness 
of Big Data is … the result of a representation of the messiness of reality. It does 
allow us to get closer to a digital representation of reality”. boyd and Crawford (2012, 
p. 665) suggest that the unprecedented scale, breadth and depth of big data, the 
increased automation of data production and analysis, and the algorithmic extraction 
and illustration of large-scale patterns in human behavior all contribute to the 
widespread belief that large data sets, combined with computational techniques that 
can reveal their inherent truths, “offer a higher form of intelligence and knowledge 
that can generate insights that were previously impossible, with the aura of truth, 
objectivity, and accuracy”. Thus while the Big Data phenomenon is seen as providing 
opportunities for the social sciences—through the provision of large, new and rich 
forms of social, cultural, economic, political and historical data (Mayer-Schönberger 
and Cukier, 2013)—there is also concern that it is generating “an epistemological 
approach that enables post-positivist forms of computational social science” (Kitchin, 
2014b, p. 10) and qualitative research. In particular, the Big Data phenomenon is seen 
as giving rise to “new forms of empiricism” (Kitchin 2014b, p. 1) that privilege data-
driven modes of knowledge in which data are understood as proxies for truths about 
the real world, truths that can be uncovered through the use of ostensibly neutral, 
innocent and agnostic data analytics without recourse to theoretical interpretation 
(Kitchin, 2014b).  
 
On a posthumanist approach, the representationalist practices and discourses 
associated with the Big Data movement are a matter of ethical concern, including its 
treatment of data as given and self-evident, and its failure to account for the 
philosophical, methodological, technological, moral, social, political, economic 
practices and (labour) processes through which data are constituted. The empiricism, 
and marginalization of philosophy and theory (Kitchin, 2014b), underpinning Big 
Data’s constitution of itself deletes precisely those multiple and entangled elements of 
Big Data’s apparatus of bodily production that posthumanism insists must be 
accounted for. Following Haraway and Barad, Big Data’s claim to innocent 
knowledge-making embodies and enacts an irresponsible and unethical practice, 
where “Irresponsible means unable to be called into account” (Haraway, 1988, p. 
583). The key contribution made possible by a posthumanist approach inspired by 
Haraway and Barad is to position positivism—i.e. “a specific philosophical doctrine 
that denies being either a doctrine or a philosophy” (Kolakowski, 1972, p. 7)—as an 
ethical concern, and not simply a philosophical matter. In this respect, a posthumanist 
approach seeks to overcome the divide between philosophy and ethics that 
characterizes scholarship within critical data studies. Critiques of Big Data raise both 
philosophical and ethical issues but treat these as separate concerns. In their 
discussion of the ethical dimensions of public datasets, for example, Metcalf and 
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Crawford (2016) identify the marginalization of human subjects and their rights 
within Big Data science as a growing problem. Equally, one of the key philosophical 
aims of critical data studies is to analyse “the ground upon which positivist Big Data 
science stands” (Iliadis and Russo 2016, p. 2). A posthumanist approach brings these 
two strands together by positioning a positivist philosophy of science (including its 
separation between science and ethics) as an object of ethical concern.  
 
A posthumanist ethical practice of qualitative research in a Big Data era 
 
Following Barad’s (2007, p. 390) suggestion that “the responsible practice of science 
requires a full genealogical accounting of the entangled apparatuses or practices that 
produce particular phenomena,” I want to argue that a posthumanist ethical practice of 
qualitative research in a Big Data era entails a genealogical accounting of this 
apparatus, its ontological specificity and ‘situatedness’, and its performative effects. 
This genealogical accounting, I suggest, is a non- or post-humanist way of the 
apparatus taking responsibility for itself and its world-making powers. This involves 
accounting for the multiple and entangled practices, technologies, infrastructures, 
instruments, policies, principles, laws and much more through which qualitative 
research in a Big Data constitutes itself; and their conceptual and ontological 
histories, commitments and effects. This article already enacts this posthumanist 
ethical practice by beginning to account for the humanist underpinnings of current 
philosophical, methodological and ethical approaches to qualitative research in a Big 
Data era as seen in my discussion of humanism and a humanist ethics, and how these 
inform, for example, empiricist understandings of Big Data social science as well as 
ethical concerns and practices such as the risks posed by data aggregation, data 
linkages, and data anonymization as well as the changing meaning and possibility of 
informed consent and privacy protection within this environment. 
 
On a posthumanist approach, engaging in this kind of deconstructive and genealogical 
work constitutes ethical practice because it foregrounds and accounts for the 
apparatus, and its non-innocent nature and role in bringing into being specific 
ontological configurations of data, knowledge, reality, subjects, accounts, identities, 
relationships, technologies, methods, ethics and so on. Ethical responsibility lies 
with/in a complex and dynamic system of practices that constitutes the apparatus of 
qualitative research in a Big Data era, and a posthumanist ethical practice of 
qualitative research in a Big Data era entails accounting for the non-innocent 
genealogical constitution, ontological nature, and performative effects of this 
apparatus.  
 
Concluding comments 
 
The conceptualization of a posthumanist ethics developed in this article is challenging 
and counter-intuitive. A posthumanist approach to ethics is not simply a matter of 
applying posthumanist ethical principles and practices to a specific domain, such as 
qualitative research in a Big Data era. Rather, it entails rethinking the very nature, 
meaning and practice of ethics. Not only does it opens up for critical examination the 
humanist foundations underpinning normative approaches to social science research 
ethics and that have been institutionalized within contemporary social science 
research ethics and its codes of conduct. It furthermore positions humanist 
philosophies of science, such as positivism, as matters of ethical concern. On the face 
Page 20 of 27
http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/abs
American Behavioral Scientis
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 21
of it, this posthumanist ethics bears little relation to a normative notion of research 
ethics, and its concern with “well intentioned calculations for right action” (Barad, 
2007, p. 396), or with following codified norms or rules of behaviour and ‘good 
practice’ guidelines such as informed consent, avoidance of harm, or protection of 
privacy. However, a posthumanist ethics neither simply rejects nor accepts 
conventional humanist ethical principles, practices and concerns. Rather, and I have 
suggested elsewhere, “it is a way of conceptualizing and practising research ethics 
that follows from taking up a distinctive metaphysical position on the nature and role 
of knowledge-making” (Mauthner, 2018, p. 67) and its relation to ethics. This 
approach entails critically working through humanist foundations and inheritances, 
and calling them to account for their historical, cultural and metaphysical specificities, 
genealogies and effects. A posthumanist ethics therefore paradoxically entails both a 
continuation of humanist social science knowledge making and research ethics (as 
normatively understood) and a radical ontological reconfiguration of these practices. 
The latter is achieved by challenging the naturalization of these practices; by refusing 
to take them as ontological givens; and by insisting that they account for their 
ontological existence, commitments, power and effects.11 By implication a 
posthumanist ethics is a critique or deconstruction of the humanist philosophical 
project which assumes and presumes the ontological givenness of the world, where 
deconstruction, in Barad’s  words, “is not about taking things apart in order to take 
them down, but on the contrary, about examining the foundations of certain concepts 
and ideas, seeing how contingency operates to secure the “foundations” of concepts 
we cannot live without, and using that contingency to open up other possible 
meanings/matterings” (Juelskjær & Schwennesen, 2012, p. 14).  
 
Importantly, a posthumanist ethics does not provide evaluative judgements or 
categorical statements about qualitative research in a Big Data era, and its 
performative effects. For example, it does not make claims about the benefits or 
limitations of qualitative research, and its transformations in a Big Data era. Nor does 
it simply accept or reject conventional (humanist) ethical concerns with Big Data 
practices highlighted above, but rather demands that they account for their 
metaphysical—humanist—specificity, or ‘situatedness’ in Haraway’s terms.  
A posthumanist ethics seeks to account for and materialize the historical and 
genealogical conditions of possibility for the constitution of qualitative research in a 
Big Data era, its world-making effects, and the objects/subjects it brings into being. In 
giving an account of the genealogical processes of formation and conditions of 
possibility through which qualitative research in a Big Data era materializes itself, and 
the world-making effects of these specific configurations, this posthumanist practice 
constitutes qualitative research in a Big Data era as ontologically indeterminate 
thereby opening it up, as well as its objects of study, for potential contestation. 
Creating this openness and indeterminacy, with regard to the past, present and future 
nature and effects of qualitative research in a Big Data era, is precisely the ethical 
gesture that a posthumanist ethics is after. As Haraway (1988, p. 590) suggests, 
reconfigured in this way, “science becomes the paradigmatic model, not of closure, 
but of that which is contestable and contested.”  
 
Notes 
 
1. The origins of the term Big Data are contested. One of the earliest academic 
references to the term is by Diebold (2003). Lohr (2013) favours John Mashey as 
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the originator of Big Data in the 1990s. During this period Mashey was the chief 
scientist at Silicon Graphics, a computer graphics company that dealt with many 
kinds of new data, which Mashey termed ‘big data’. For a definition of Big Data 
see Kitchin (2014a, p. 67-79). 
2. I first came across the term Big QualiData when I attended a workshop in May 
2016 on ‘BIG QUALIDATA: Tackling Analysis of Very Large Volumes of 
Qualitative Data in Social Science Research’ run at the University of Edinburgh, 
funded by the UK’s Economic and Social Research Council. The speakers talked 
about how they were using different types of software to address the key question 
of the workshop: ‘Can social researchers scale up techniques of working with 
qualitative data and meaningfully analyse massively more text than they can 
possibly read?’ (Jamieson et al., 2017). 
3. The UK Data Service was amongst the first to systematically create a dedicated 
qualitative data archive (Qualidata, now no longer a separate archive), while a 
more recent example is the Qualitative Data Repository at Syracuse University 
(https://qdr.syr.edu).  
4. For example, Cartesian dualism “insisted that the essence of the human was 
cognition and that animals were merely highly intricate machines, part of the 
material world over against the world of the mind” (Bolter, 2016, p. 3). 
5. Western philosophy is compartmentalized into distinctive branches or ‘kinds’— 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, politics, aesthetics. These a priori divisions are 
a feature of humanist philosophies, and their essentialist ontology, that 
posthumanist approaches take issue with. Barad’s (2007, p. 185) proposal for an 
“ethico-onto-epistemological” metaphysics, which is sensitive to the intertwining 
of ethics, knowing, and being, is an example of this. 
6. See Mertens and Ginsberg (2009) for wide-ranging discussions of these ethical 
principles, policies and practices; and Iphofen and Tolich (2018) for discussions of 
qualitative research ethics. 
7. I find the term ‘posthumanism’ useful to characterize Haraway and Barad’s work, 
and to distinguish it from other critical projects, even though Haraway (2016) 
distances herself from the concept. Barad (2007), however, defines her philosophy 
of science as ‘posthumanist performative’ and I draw specifically on her notion of 
posthumanism in this article. Barad has developed what she calls an ‘agential 
realist’ metaphysical framework as an alternative to a classical Newtonian and 
Cartesian metaphysics. Classical formulations of philosophy and science, she 
suggests, are underpinned by a representationalist metaphysics that fails to “take 
account of the practices through which representations are produced” (Barad, 
2007, p. 53). Representationalism, she continues, “takes the notion of separation as 
foundational. It separates the world into the ontologically disjunct domains of 
words and things, leaving itself with the dilemma of their linkage such that 
knowledge is possible” (Barad, 2007, p. 137). Agential realism shifts these 
foundational assumptions by refusing to “take separateness to be an inherent 
feature of how the world is” (Barad, 2007, p. 136) and by attending to the material 
practices through which separation (e.g. between representations and that which is 
represented) is produced. Agential realism is thus a “posthumanist performative” 
(Barad, 2007, p. 135) metaphysics: performative in that practices of inquiry are 
understood as helping to constitute (rather than represent already constituted) 
bodies, meanings and boundaries; and posthumanist in that it specifically rejects 
the assumed and “alleged spatial, ontological, and epistemological distinction that 
sets humans apart” (Barad, 2007, p. 136). 
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8. In this sense, posthumanism neither rejects nor accepts humanism (including 
humanist practices of inquiry, the humanist subject, and a humanist ethics). Rather, 
its calls into question both humanism’s philosophical commitments (e.g. to a pre-
existing human rational autonomous subject) and their assumed self-evidence. On 
this approach, posthumanism seeks to deconstruct humanism and its apparent 
inevitability, and calls humanism to account for itself. It insists that humanist 
philosophies and practices cannot simply be taken as given, but rather must justify 
themselves and their specific commitments. On my reading, posthumanism must 
also be held to account and justify its own ontological being (see Mauthner 2015, 
p. 331, Mauthner 2018, p. 60). 
9. I want to emphasize that my conceptualization of a ‘posthumanist ethics’ reflects 
my own understanding and interpretation of the works of Haraway and Barad (see 
also Mauthner, 2018). For an alternative reading of Barad’s approach in particular, 
see, for example, Rekret (2016). 
10. This notion of the material-semiotic relies on a specific conceptualization of 
materiality as ‘ontological processes of materialization’, in contrast to other 
theoretical understandings of materiality as ‘social structures’, ‘symbolic objects’ 
and ‘material artifacts’ (Mauthner, 2018). 
11. In this respect, a posthumanist ethics has resonances with Levinas’ ethics as 
the exploration of conditions of possibility of any interest in good actions or lives 
(Derrida, 1967/1978). To borrow Derrida’s term, a posthumanist ethics can be 
thought of as “an ethics of ethics” (Critchley, 1999, p. 4). 
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